Regional inequality in China appears to be persistent and even growing in the last two decades. We study potential explanations for this phenomenon. After making adjustments for the difference in the cost of living across provinces, we find that some of the inequality in real wages could be attributed to differences in quality of labor, industry composition, labor supply elasticities, and geographical location of provinces. These factors, taken together, explain about half of the cross-province real wage difference. Interestingly, we find that inter-province redistribution did not help offset regional inequality during our sample period. We also demonstrate that inter-province migration, while driven in part by levels and changes in wage differences across provinces, does not offset these differences. These results imply that cross-province labor market mobility in China is still limited, which contributes to the persistence of cross-province wage differences.
paper we take it a step further to understand the relationship between the persistence of regional inequality and labor movement.
Some researchers argue that persistent inequalities in income are the result of unmeasured offsetting factors that work to equalize well-being across regional agents (Rice and Venables, 2003) .
In our study we find, not surprisingly, that cost-of-living differences are, indeed, an important offsetting factor. Thus, we adjust average nominal wage in each province by province-specific CPI to obtain average real wage. We find, however, that even in terms of real wage cross-province inequality in China is large and persistent.
We analyze factors that might explain this persistent inequality, such as the quality of labor, which we proxy by measures of education level in each province; labor productivity, which we proxy by the industrial composition in each province; labor supply elasticity, which we measure as a share of agricultural population in the province; access to export markets, which we measure as the size and presence of large sea ports in the province; 3 cross-province government transfers. We find that, with the exception of government transfers, all these factors help explain a substantial portion of wage differentials. Nevertheless, about half of the variance in real wages across provinces remains after controlling for these factors.
During our sample period from 1993 to 2011, the restrictions on migration resulting from the system of permanent registration (hukou) are being gradually relaxed, if not de jure, then de facto (Bao, Bodvarsson, Hou, and Zhao, 2011) . 4 It is, therefore, natural to expect that such persistent unexplained difference in real wages across provinces would generate cross-province migration.
Using the summary data from 2000 and 2010 population censuses we find that cross-province migration in the second half of the 1990s and the second half of 2000s is indeed partly driven by real wage differences and by differences in growth rates of real wages.
Even though cross-province migration is partly driven by wage differences, it still appears quite limited. In particular, migration flows do not seem to reduce regional inequality, once we control for factors that we find to affect wage inequality. This suggests that the migration is still quite 3 Much of the literature emphasizes inland-coastal differences. However, as demonstrated in Candelaria, Daly, and Hale (2009) , it is the presence of a large port that makes all the difference, not simply the presence of the coastline. 4 We briefly describe China's migration policies in Section 2.
constrained by the remaining barriers. This finding is consistent with the literature. Chan and Buckingham (2008) argue that recent reforms of the hukou system did not make migration any easier, but may in fact further reduced mobility, especially between rural and urban population. Whalley and Zhang (2007) calibrate the effect of removal of the hukou system and show that the resulting reduction in regional inequality is sizable, indicating that such removal has not occurred yet. More recently, Bao, Bodvarsson, Hou, and Zhao (2011) show empirically that migration is still very sensitive to hukou constraints, even in 2000-05, although the sensitivity has declined relative to 1995-2000.
Taken together, our results indicate that regional inequality is likely to persist in China for quite some time, since it is due to structural and long-term factors such as education, industry composition, regional labor supply, and geographical location. While further removing barriers to labor mobility may alleviate some of the regional wage differences, it is likely to be a slow process, because it needs to be accompanied by urban development. 5 In the meantime, crossprovince income redistribution may be useful to address social and economic tensions that regional inequality can bring. Our study finds that in the period of consideration inter-province transfers did not help offset regional wage differences.
The paper is organized as follows: We begin by describing the policies that restrict labor movement in China in Section 2. We describe our data and recent trends in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude in Section 5.
Migration policy in modern China
In 1958, Mao Zedong set up an hereditary residency permit (Hukou) system defining where people could work. This system classifies individuals as either "rural" or "urban" workers and assigned them to a specific geographic area. Under the hukou system, one cannot acquire a legal permanent residence and the numerous community-based rights, opportunities, benefits and privileges in places other than the location assigned in his hukou. Only through proper authorization of the government can one permanently change his hukou location. For longer than one-month stay and especially 5 Chan (2009) argues that the hukou system is a major obstacle to China's development.
when seeking local employment, one must apply and be approved for a temporary residential permit.
Violators are subject to fines, detention, and forced repatriation (partially relaxed in 2003). 6
The main impact of the hukou system is on rural-to-urban mobility, which explains an extraordinary low degree of urbanization in China (Chan and Zhang, 1999) . In addition to limiting the rural-to-urban migration of the workers, this system limited migration across regions: migrants would need to obtain registration in the new area before they could be allowed to work legally.
Because of bureaucracy and red tape, obtaining registration could take months or years. Hence, the migration process in China was in many ways similar to the migration process across national borders.
Until 1978, the system was enforced rather strictly: police would periodically round up those without valid residence permit, place them in detention centers, and expel them from cities. After While recent reforms made it easier for migrants to survive without hukou, they did not make it easier to obtain one. Thus, many people, especially those with families, are hesitant to permanently change their location. Moreover, fees charged for temporary residency permits, while fairly affordable, add to the cost of moving. Nevertheless, according to the census data, in 2000 almost 30 percent of the population was residing in a province other than the one in which they had their hukou.
There has been more progress in reforming the hukou system at the provincial level than at the national level. Between 2001 and 2007, a number of provinces adopted various measures, mostly addressing the rural-urban migration limitations. These measures ranged from changing the administration of the hukou system to completely abolishing the differences between rural and urban hukou. 7
For the purpose of our project, we have to recognize that the barriers to cross-province migration in China still exist but were weakening throughout our sample period. Moreover, we have to take into account the fact that the progress of reform was uneven across provinces.
Data
In this section, we describe our data sources for inequality, explanatory variables, and migration.
We also describe recent trends and patterns in regional inequality and migration.
Inequality and related data
We use national and provincial level data that are reported in the China Statistical Yearbook.
This annual publication is compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China and is published by the China Statistics Press. In conjunction with these data, we also use CEIC Data's "China Premium Database" because it provides time series of the data in the China Statistical Yearbook.
Using these sources, we construct an annual data sample from 1993 to 2011, covering a period of fast economic growth in China. Due to data limitations, not all series have coverage for the entire period. 
Migration data
We use migration data that is collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China and of origin and destination, but also the area within each province that the migrant came from and went to. This is especially useful to track patterns of migration such as the movement of people from rural to urban areas-both intra-and inter-provincially. 8
In both censuses, individuals 5 years of age or older were asked if in the census year they resided in a different subcounty-level unit than that in which they lived five years prior. If an individual moved his hukou to the new location or he resided in the new location for more than six months, he was counted as a migrant. While the migration data includes in-migration to Chinese provinces from Hong Kong, Macau, and abroad, we exclude these numbers from our analysis.
Trends in inter-province inequality
We now turn to the description of the trends and patterns in our data. Figure 1 shows median average levels of disposable income for urban and rural households and for urban households in different subgroups of provinces. One can immediately see the growing gap between urban and rural income that was much discussed in the literature. We can also see large differences in urban income across provinces, especially between coastal and inland provinces, as has also been discussed in the literature. As Caballero, Candelaria, and Hale (2009) show, for coastal provinces, the presence of a large commercial port is important.
In this paper we leave aside the important rural-urban inequality, since it is well studied in the existing literature, and focus on inter-provincial inequality in urban income. We have some concerns about the accuracy of disposable income data at the provincial level and therefore for the rest of the paper we focus on the average wage data. Average wage data is not reported separately for rural and urban households, but the detailed description of these series (see Table A .1) suggests that most of the input into average wage comes from the urban wages. We, therefore, frame the rest of the paper as an analysis of inter-provincial inequality in urban income.
Unlike most countries, China provides province by province consumer price index (CPI) data.
We take advantage of this fact to calculate real wages using individual province CPI, which allows us to account for differences in cost of living in different provinces. Figure 2 depicts the coefficient of variation of nominal and real wages across provinces as a measures of cross-province inequality.
We can see that rapid increase in urban wage dispersion from 1990 to 2001 followed by a gradual decline. Figure 2 also shows that part of the measured inequality in wages disappears once we account for the cost of living. For example, in 2002 the coefficient of variation of nominal wage across provinces was 0.34, while the coefficient of variation of real wage was 0.26. Because real wage inequality and not nominal wage inequality is economically important, we continue our analysis in terms of average real wage. In terms of real wage, we also see a rapid increase in cross-province inequality from 1990 to 1999, followed by a very small decline from 2006 to 2011.
Despite some decline in cross-province inequality in recent years, it remains very large, even in real terms. At the end of our sample period, the coefficient of variation of real wage is over 0.22, which means the standard deviation of the real wage across provinces is almost a quarter of the mean real wage.
Patterns in inter-province migration
We now describe trends in the migration patterns in China. We focus on the migration that took we are able to classify migrants as entering a town, city, or county. We broadly define city and town as an urban region and county as a rural region. 9
A large part of migration took place within provinces, with population moving from rural to urban areas. Thirty five percent of the intra-province migrating population moved from rural to urban areas in 1995-2000. 10 Inter-province migration was also important, with 76 percent of all inter-provincial migrants going into urban areas and almost none going to rural areas. Tables A.3a and A.3b report migration for all provinces between 1995 and 2000 and between 2005 and 2010, respectively, both cross-province and rural-to-urban migration within the province, in levels and as a percent of host province population in 1997 and 2007, respectively. Not surprisingly, the provincial cities of Beijing and Shanghai, as well as the Guandong province that is adjacent to Hong Kong, attracted the most cross-province migrants as a share of their population in both time periods. We also note that coastal provinces tended to attract more cross-province migrants than inland provinces as a share of their population. Trends in intra-provincial migration are more difficult to identify. For intra-province migration, the variance in rural-to-urban intra-province migration across provinces is much smaller than that of the cross-province migration. We also note that within province migration increased substantially from 2.7 percent to 6.1 percent between the 2000 and 2010 census periods, indicating that, indeed, some relaxation of hukou controls was happening.
What explains persistent inter-province inequality in China
In this section we study explanations for persistent inter-province inequality. We begin by studying the effects of quality of labor, industry composition, government transfers, and geographical factors. We then turn to the analysis of cross-province migration patterns and test whether interprovince migration is driven, at least in part, by wage differences and whether it, in turn, helps offset some of these differences. We conduct our analysis using the average wages adjusted by province-specific CPI, which we refer to as real wages.
Reasons for real-wage inequality
We begin with a measure of the quality of human capital that may explain differences in real wages. Since we do not have a direct measure of labor quality, we use two different measures of education level in the province to proxy for the quality of labor. If observed differences in wages are fully explained by differences in labor quality, there is no reason to believe that such differences should go away. We then consider industry composition in the provinces. Because labor productivity may be higher in some industries, industry composition will affect average wage in the province. While we would expect labor to move to the industries where it is more productive, structural changes in the economy take a long time to complete and thus inequality that is due to industry composition is expected to be persistent. Next, we test whether the labor supply elasticity, as measured by the share of agricultural population in the province, explains wage differences. If migration across provinces is constrained, we would expect wages to be higher in provinces with lower share of potentially available labor that is currently employed in agriculture. We also test whether some of the wage differentials across provinces are offset by transfers from the central government. Finally, we test whether access to export markets, as measured by total commercial ship berth capacity in the province, explains wage differences. Since access to the sea cannot be changed and port capacity can only be changed slowly, real wage differences that are due to such geographical factors are likely to be persistent.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 1 . The first two columns present our results with respect to measures of education level in each province. In the first column we measure education level as a number of college graduates per capita, and in the second column we use real government expenditures on education per capita. We can see that both measures indicate that higher levels of education are associated with higher average real wages. We can also see from the adjusted R 2 that the first measure explains 26 percent of standard deviation in real wages across provinces, while the second measure explains 66 percent, although there is a possibility that there is some spurious correlation in case of government expenses on education -provinces that are wealthy for whatever reason are likely to have higher wages and more expenditure on education. 11 For this reason, and because of sample limitation in the case of the second measure, we will use the first measure as a control variable in the tests that follow. Moreover, the first measure seems to be more relevant, as it measures the contemporaneous level of college education in the province.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 use different measures of industrial composition -employment shares of secondary and tertiary industries (primary being a base category) and the share of agricultural population. We find that higher shares of primary and tertiary industries, which tend to have larger labor productivity, are associated with higher real wage and explain about 54 percent of cross-province wage differences. Similarly, a higher share of agricultural population is associated with lower wages and explains 44 percent of cross-province wage differences.
Column (5) estimates a correlation between real wages and transfers from federal to provincial budgets. We find that there is no such correlation; that is, Chinese government is neither creating nor smoothing cross-province wage differences.
Finally, results reported in column (6) of Table 1 demonstrate that the provinces with larger commercial ports, as measured by their commercial berth capacity, tend to have higher wages. This is likely to be partly driven by export platforms in these provinces, which partly are owned by foreign companies and tend to pay higher wages, at least to skilled workers (Hale and Long, 2008) .
Berth capacity, however, only explains a small portion of cross-province variation in real wages.
In Column (7) we include all the above controls together, even though many of them are highly correlated. 12 We can see that taken together they explain 84 percent of the cross-province real wage differences if measured by the adjusted R 2 . In terms of the standard deviation of the residual in the last year of the sample, it is about one third of the standard deviation of real wages across provinces in the same year. If we extract a first principle component from all the explanatory variables, and include that instead, we find that about 64 percent of cross-province wage differences are explain by this first principle component (see Column 9 of Table 1 ). The standard deviation of residual in the last year of the sample in this case is about half of the standard deviation of real wage in the same year.
All the regressions described above and reported in therefore are identified based on time-series as well as cross-province differences. To separate the two effects we first include province fixed effects in our regressions with all controls and with the first principle component (Columns (8) and (10) of Table 1 ). We find that only education measures are significantly correlated with within variation in real wages, with fixed effects absorbing all other cross-province differences. Overall, regressions with fixed effects do not perform much better than regressions without. This indicates that, as we discussed above, the results are identified off of cross-province rather than within differences. We confirm this once again by re-estimating all the regressions in Table 1 with either a linear trend or with year fixed effects and find that the results remain almost identical. 13
Labor mobility
Before addressing the question of whether cross-province migration offsets some of the wage differences, we have to establish that cross-province migration is at least in part driven by wage differences. To this end, in Table 2 we test whether cross-province migration into urban areas between years t − 5 and t is correlated with differences in real wages across provinces in t − 5, where t ∈ {2000, 2010} is the year of the census. Similarly, in Table 3 we test whether cross-province migration between years t − 5 and t is correlated with differences in real wages in t − 10 and differences in growth rates of real wage between t − 10 and t − 5. In both specifications, migration does not affect wage differences because it occurs after the real wage is measured. We find that both the level and the growth rate of real wages have positive effect on migration into urban areas of a given province from other provinces. 14 These results hold even when we control for the explanatory variables that we found to be important in the first part of our analysis. These results are also robust to including a different intercept for the observations resulting from the later, 2010, census period. 15 Not surprisingly, province fixed effects absorb the effects of the wage level, but not of 13 The results of these regressions are not reported in interest of space. The effect of linear trend is not significant in most regressions.
14 For comparison, Tables A.5. and A.6. provide the same analysis for rural to urban migration within provinces. These results show that for the within-province migration growth rate of wages matters more than the level.
15 Even though a later period indicator does enter significantly, we chose to report benchmark regressions for consistency. In the interest of space we do not report regressions with the second period dummy, but they are available upon request. wage growth. Importantly, two-thirds to three-quarters of variation in migration flows is explained by levels of and changes in real wages alone.
Coefficients on other explanatory variables have expected signs -higher education and larger share of tertiary industries attract more migrants, while higher share of agricultural population lower the inflow of migrants. Interestingly, share of secondary industries, while associated with higher wages (See Table 1 ), has a negative effect on migration. This shows that once wage differences are accounted for, secondary industries are not particularly attractive to permanent migrants. 16 Berth capacity does not enter significantly in these regressions.
Having established that migration is indeed driven by wage differences, we now turn to the main question of interest -does migration offset any of the wage differences? To this end, we estimate the effect of cross-province migration into urban areas between years t − 5 and t on real wage in t + 1, while controlling for our explanatory variables in t + 1, where t ∈ 2000, 2010 is a census year.
The results are reported in Table 4 . 17 In column (1) we see that, far from offsetting wage differences, higher migration is associated with higher real wage. This effect is spurious, however. Because real wage differences across provinces are highly persistent over time, migration in t − 5 to t may be endogenous even with respect to t + 1 real wages. To rule out this possibility, we add real wage in t − 5 as an additional control variable. As we can see from column (12), where real wage in t − 5 is the only regressor, real wage is, indeed, highly persistent. 18 We can see that once the real wage in t − 5 control is included, migration has a much smaller positive effect on real wages (Column (2)) and no statistically significant effect in subsequent regressions that include t + 1 variables that we found important in explaining real wage. Moreover, the reduction in the variance of the residual is minimal to nil (compare column (2) with column (12)). We conclude, therefore, that cross-province migration that occurred between 1995 and 16 Note that our migration data are unlikely to include temporary migrant workers. 17 For comparison, results of similar tests for rural to urban migration within provinces are reported in Table  A .7. The results for the within-province migration are once again very similar to those discussed below for the cross-province migration.
18 All the results we discuss here are not affected by the inclusion of an indicator for the later census sample. These regressions are not reported in interest of space but are available upon request.
subsequently years. This is not particularly surprising, since, as we discussed in the Introduction and in Section 2, the effects of hukou system on restricting migration are still substantial and therefore observed migration, although driven by real wage differences, is not sufficient to offset them.
Conclusion
Provincial statistics show that regional inequality in China has been persistent in the last two decades. We find that main sources of this persistence were structural and long-term factors such as labor quality, industrial composition, regional labor supply, and geographical location. We find that inter-provincial transfers did not offset wage inequality during our sample period, and neither did inter-province migration. These findings suggest that regional income inequality in China is not likely to go away in the near future.
While we believe that fully removing barriers to labor mobility will help reduce cross-province wage inequality, we are aware of the fact that urban infrastructure is unable to accommodate large inflows of new migrants. We therefore view the message of this paper as more positive than normative -given the gradual nature of structural changes and urban infrastructure development, we should expect that regional inequality in China will persist for quite some time.
A policy implication of this observation is that social tensions that arise due to such inequality may need to be addressed in the short run through redistribution. According to our analysis, such redistribution has not been present during our sample period (at least not in the measures we considered). Chinese government, however, recognizes inequality as an important problem, which is reflected in its most recent five-year plan. 
(8) 
(8) CPI Consumer price index (1988 = 100).
REAL WAGE Average annual wage in yuan per person for staff and workers in enterprises, institutions, and government agencies deflated by the consumer price index (1988 = 100).
COLLEGE Number of college graduates of regular institutions of higher learning scaled by population.
EDUCATION Expenditure of provincial government on education scaled by population.
PRIMARY Share of employees involved in the production of raw goods (primary sector).
SECONDARY Share of employees involved in the manufacture of goods (secondary sector).
TERTIARY Share of employees in the services sector (tertiary sector).
AGRICULTURAL Share of agricultural population.
BERTH CAPACITY Number of berths in major coastal ports (10,000 ton class).
SUBSIDY National government subsidy to provincial government per capita.
INMIGRATION Number of migrants moving into an urban area of a province from an urban or rural area in another province, in basis points of population from 2.5 years before.
WITHINMIGRATION Number of migrants moving into an urban area of a given province from a rural area in that province, in basis points of population from 2.5 years before. Table A 
